In this paper we examine how an education policy intervention -the introduction of a comprehensive school in Sweden that increased the number of compulsory years of schooling -affected cognitive and non-cognitive skills and long-term health. We use detailed administrative data combined with survey information to create a data set with background information, child ability and long-term adult outcomes. We show that the education reform results in significant gains in skills among children, but the effects on long-term health are overall negligible. We also demonstrate that the reform had heterogeneous effects across families with different socio-economic backgrounds and initial skill endowments, with significant improvements in cognition and skills for lower SES and lower ability people.
Introduction
Cognition and health are important determinants of human capital, which drives earnings potential and ultimately standards of living. There are significant inequalities in both cognitive and noncognitive skills as well as health related to parental socio-economic status in all societies that have been studied. 4 This affects equality of opportunity, causes poverty and holds back upward social mobility. In this study we provide new estimates of the impact of schooling reform on cognitive skills, non-cognitive skills and health by parental background and by early ability, presenting evidence on the ability of public policy to affect children's human capital development and thus longer-term outcomes in society.
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The question we ask in this paper is how do improvements in the quantity (and quality) of schooling induced by education reform targeting teenagers affect human capital accumulation; and importantly, do the effects differ depending on the socio-economic background and early ability of the child. In particular we consider how education reform affects cognitive skills, social skills and long-term health, all of which are elements of human capital that affect earnings and well-being more generally, by types of parental education and early ability scores of the children.
To consider this important issue we use the quasi-experimental variation induced by a major educational reform in Sweden that was gradually introduced from 1949 to 1962. A key element of the education reform was to increase compulsory schooling by one or two years, depending municipality. We set up a unique data set from both administrative and survey sources. For all individuals born in Sweden in the cohorts between 1946 and 1957 we have detailed health and mortality information and importantly for our purposes we also have parental education. Using this larger and rich data we estimate the effect of the reform on health. 6 For a sub-set of our large dataset, 10 percent of men of the two cohorts born in 1948 and 1953 or almost 7,900 observations, our data includes results from two cognitive tests: at age 12, before the pre-reform compulsory schooling was complete, and at 18, after compulsory schooling had ended (under both schooling systems). both pre-and post-reform compulsory schooling was finished. Our data also include results from professional assessments of non-cognitive skills at age 18.
An important contribution of our research relates to the impact of interventions relatively late in a child's life and the more general question of the appropriate timing of external interventions to improve human capital. There exists evidence that investments in human capital at early ages (such as during the pre-school years) can have positive and lasting effects on skills and labor market success (see the review by Cunha et al, 2006) . Importantly, early interventions have been shown to be complementary with later ones (see, Cunha, Heckman and Schennach, 2010) . With this in mind, it is important to show the extent to which interventions targeting teens, and particularly those from lower socio-economic background, can be effective.
Previous research has also demonstrated that extra education obtained as late as the teenage years could have positive effects on cognitive skills as measured by the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). The AFQT is an appealing test measure as it is administered around the same age as the Swedish Army draft tests and purports to measure similar skills. Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2004) find that on average, one additional year of schooling in high school results in an increase of 0.16 to 0.19 standard deviations in the AFQT score. They also report that the effects are larger for years of schooling attained before the 9 th grade (as in this research) than in grades 10-12. Cascio and Lewis (2006) use National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) '79 data and differences in schooling attainment arising from school-entry cutoff dates to show that an extra year of schooling increases minorities' achievement on the AFQT by one third of a standard deviation.
All previous large-sample studies examining the causal relationship between education and health 7 do not investigate differences relating to socioeconomic background. This poses the question as to whether the effects of compulsory schooling reforms, and generally of interventions that are most likely to affect lower socio-economic status individuals, are missed when averaged with the effects on higher SES groups that are unaffected. Moreover, given the literature on the complementarity of interventions across stages of childhood it is also important to be able to 7 Lleras-Muney, 2005 considers the case of the US in the first half of the 20th century, when many states increased the number of years children had to attend school. Her results imply that an extra year of schooling reduces the 10-year mortality rate by over 6 percentage points given a mean mortality rate of ten percent. Mazumder (2008) revisits these results by including state-specific time trends that significantly diminish the estimated coefficients. Also see the corrigendum to Lleras-Muney's original 2005 paper on her website http://www.econ.ucla.edu/alleras/research/papers/8523_Lleras_Correction.pdf. Oreopoulos (2006) uses an RD approach and finds beneficial effects of education on health in the UK as a result of increases in compulsory schooling. However, Royer and Clark (2012) find no effect. Spasojevic (2010) and Lager and Torssander (2012) estimate the average health effect of the education reform under study in this paper. See Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2011) and Mazumder (2012) for a review.
examine the heterogeneity of effects across different prior ability groups. 8 Our study is able to offer some evidence on whether and in what dimensions family background is important.
The results demonstrate that the Swedish compulsory schooling reform had a significant positive effect on the cognitive skills of men of military enlistment age (18-19 years old). The average individual experienced an increase of seven to ten percent of a standard deviation, the strongest gains accruing to boys coming from low SES families and with low initial cognitive skills measured pre-reform in the 6 th school grade. This is an important result because it shows that keeping potential school dropouts as a group longer in school can have beneficial effects on basic cognitive skills. For the higher SES group there is no effect either on their school attendance or on their cognition; there is however a large improvement in their non-cognitive skills, possibly because now they are attending non-selective schools with children from a broader range of backgrounds.
The effects on health are either zero or very small both for the whole population and for individuals from a lower SES background. The results are consistent across various different measures, including mortality, hospitalization and receipt of sick pay, all of which show either no effect or negligible improvements. Perhaps the only exception is a significant and reasonably large (but not very precisely estimated) decline in mortality for low initial ability individuals. This is important because it is this group that such interventions are meant to benefit. It highlights the importance of allowing for heterogeneity of public policy effects in important dimensions. Further research should seek to corroborate this result in other data sets.
The Comprehensive School Reform

The Swedish school system before and after the reform
Prior to the implementation of the comprehensive school reform, pupils attended a common basic compulsory school (folkskolan) until grade six. After the sixth grade pupils were selected to continue either for one or, in mainly urban areas, two years in the basic compulsory school, or to attend the three year junior secondary school (realskolan). The selection of pupils into the two different school tracks was based on their past performance, measured by grades. The pre-reform compulsory school was in most cases administered at the municipality level. The junior secondary school was a prerequisite for the subsequent upper secondary school, which was itself required for higher education.
In 1948 a parliamentary committee proposed a school reform that implemented a new nineyear compulsory comprehensive school. 9 The comprehensive school reform had three main elements:
1. An extension of the number of years of compulsory schooling to 9 years in the entire country.
2. Abolition of early selection in different schooling tracks based on academic ability.
Although pupils in the comprehensive schools were able to choose between three tracks after the sixth grade -one track including vocational training, a general track, and an academic level preparing for later upper secondary school -they were kept in common schools and classes until the ninth grade.
3. Introduction of a national curriculum. The pre-reform compulsory schools were administrated by municipalities and the pre-reform curriculum varied between municipalities.
The social experiment
The social experiment with the new comprehensive nine-year compulsory school started during an assessment period between 1949 and 1962, when the final curriculum was decided. 10 The proposed 9 The school reform and its development are described in Meghir and Palme (2003) , Meghir and Palme (2005) , and Holmlund (2007) . Holmlund (2007) offers detailed analysis of the implementation of the reform and shows that, conditional on municipality fixed effects, there are no significant observable predictors of the timing of the reform. For more detailed reference on the reform, see Marklund (1981) . 10 The official evaluation was mainly of administrative nature. Details on this evaluation are also described in Marklund (1981) .
new school system, as described above, was introduced in municipalities or parts of city communities, which in 1952 numbered 1,055 (including 18 city communities). Figure 1 shows the take up rate of the experiment by cohort. It is evident from Figure 1 that the cohorts included in our empirical analysis, born between 1946 and 1957, cover the entire period of implementation of the comprehensive school. In 1962 it was decided that the new comprehensive school would become the standard education in Sweden. The last class that graduated from the old schooling system did so in 1970.
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Figure 1: Percentage share of birth cohort assigned to the post reform (comprehensive) school system.
The selection of municipalities was not based on random assignment. However, the decision to select the areas was based on an attempt to choose locations that were representative for the entire country, both in terms of demographics as well as geographically. In the first phase of the experiment an experimental committee appointed by the National Board of Education chose municipalities from a pool of applicants in order to form a "representative" sample of municipalities. In later phases of the experiment the selection process became less strict. Municipalities could elect to implement the comprehensive school starting with first or fifth grade cohorts. Once the grade of implementation was fixed, all individuals from the cohort immediately affected and all subsequent cohorts went to comprehensive school. The older cohorts continued in the pre-reform school. Additional details about the intent and the implementation of the reform are discussed in the Appendix.
11 Table A1 in the appendix shows the number of observations in each birth cohort and the proportion assigned to the reform. Meghir and Palme (2005) and Holmlund (2007) Holmlund and described in Holmlund (2007) , to assign reform status to each individual in the sample.
The date of death is obtained from the national cause of death register (Socialstyrelsen, 2009a) . This register contains the date and a three digit ICD 9 code for the main underlying cause of death for all Swedish citizens. Mortality data for this sample are available between 1985 and 2005.
Thus we can only estimate effects on mortality between the ages of 28 and 60. While this puts age restrictions on the conclusions we draw using this sample, the period does cover the most productive periods of a person's life. Our mortality findings are economically meaningful even though we do not observe mortality among older adults and the elderly. The data on sick-pay insurance receipts for each year between 1991 and 2006 comes from the National Social Insurance Board registers including all transactions between the social insurance administration and the insured citizens. These registers were matched to our original sample. Sweden has a compulsory sick-pay insurance replacing foregone earnings from temporarily lost work ability due to illnesses or other health deficiencies. The replacement level is currently 80 percent of forgone earnings up to a social security ceiling, but has varied somewhat during the period covered in the data (for a detailed description of the sick-pay insurance system in Sweden, see Palme, 1995 or 2005) . A certificate from a physician, certifying inability of the insured individual to do his or her regular work, is required on the eighth day in the sickness spell. Payments for the first week in a sickness spell are provided by the employer and consequently not included in our data. #Note: Vocational education is generally two years of occupational specific education after the compulsory level; the higher education category combines upper secondary education, which is in most cases three years of general education required for entrance to higher education; and any education level beyond that
We define the different cause of death categories as mutually exclusive. This means that an ICD death code features in one category only. For example, death from lung cancer is clearly due to cancer, but we have grouped lung cancer and liver cirrhosis under the preventable causes of death category. That is why an individual who died from lung cancer would be classified as having died from a preventable cause of death. At the same time, someone who died from pancreatic cancer is classified as having died from a cancer-related cause. In Appendix Table A2 we list the ICD causes of death that feature in each separate cause of death category as defined in Table 2 . The same grouping of diagnoses is used to define hospitalization by cause.
The Association between Education and Human Capital
As a descriptive device we document the relationship between our various outcome measures and schooling. A summary of the results for cognitive test scores, mortality, hospitalizations and sick pay are presented in Table 3 below. A year of education is associated with 17% of a standard deviation improvement in test scores. It is also associated with better health: a year of education is correlated with a decline in the mortality hazard rate by about 10.5 percentage points (pp); a decline in hospitalizations by 1.4pp and a decline of sick pay receipts by 1.9pp.
The overall mortality rate up to 2006 in the population of men born 1946-1957 is 4.7 percent.
An additional year of schooling is associated with a reduction of the rate by 10.06 percent to 4.23 percent. The implications is that in 1986 when our mortality data start, the average man from these cohorts could expect to live for 228.7 months in the next 20 years ((1-0.047)*12 months*20 years).
An additional year of education is associated with an increase in life expectancy of about 1.2 months (expected increase in months of life for someone with an extra year of education is (0.106*0.047)*12 months*20 years).
The mean hospitalization rate in the sample is 52 percent. According to the estimates in column (3) of Table 3 below, an additional year of education is associated with a decline in the risk of ever having been hospitalized in 20 years by 1.4 percentage points, equivalent to 2.7 percent of the mean. Notes: reform status is assigned based on the municipality of birth; all municipalities included except Stockholm.* indicates significance at the 10% level, *** indicates significance at the 1%; all standard errors clustered on the municipality of birth level An additional year of education decreases the probability of having taken any sick leave in a year by 1.3 percentage points. This is a non-trivial 7.6 percent decrease from the mean rate of 17 percent.
All the effects shown in Table 3 are large and the extent to which they represent causal impacts, at least for those affected by the reform at the lower end of the educational distribution, is what we set out to investigate.
We next document the relationship between cognitive and social skills as measured by the Army draft, earnings and long-term health. As Table 4 demonstrates, one standard deviation higher score in cognitive skills is associated with an increase in lifetime earnings of about 11%. Increasing social skills as measured by Army psychologists by one standard deviation is also associated with an increase in earnings, but the effect is about 25 percent lower than the comparable estimate for cognitive skills. Among individuals with identical measures of social skills, one standard deviation increase in cognitive skills is associated with 9.6 percent increase in lifetime earnings.
The lower panel of Table 4 shows the correlations of cognitive and social skills with longterm health outcomes. One standard deviation positive change in cognitive skills is associated with over twenty percent reduction in the mortality hazard, and over 4 percent decrease in the probability of ever having been hospitalized. 18 Interestingly, we obtain estimates of similar magnitude for social and cognitive skills in the mortality regressions, while the estimates for hospitalization clearly show a larger impact of cognitive skills. Note: Robust 95% confidence intervals in parentheses, clustered on the municipality of birth level; all regressions include municipality of birth fixed effects and cohort dummies; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Empirical Strategy
We have two data sets. One includes all cohorts born between 1946 and 1957 and one that includes only the survey data for the 1948 and 1953 cohorts. Both data sets include information from administrative sources. The 1948/53 survey data is of interest because it contains information on the military enlistment tests, which provide the cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes in late adolescence. They also report child ability measured at age 12, which is a source of impact heterogeneity that we consider. This measure of ability cannot have been affected by the reform, as it was taken before children from some municipalities were sent to reform schools. We present estimates from both data sources, depending on the outcome and on the conditioning variables. The empirical analysis is based on difference-in-differences assumptions across municipalities and cohorts.
Our empirical strategy is based on comparing the evolution of outcomes across cohorts in municipalities that introduced the reform for the younger cohort but not the older one to those who either introduced it for none or to those who introduced it for both. Underlying all our specifications is a set of assumptions that justify difference-in-differences. Formally, using the notation in Athey and Imbens (2006) , denote the outcome in the untreated state by 0 = ℎ( , ) and define mi as an unobservable characteristic. Its distribution may differ across municipalities, but we require the distribution of this unobservable to be the same across cohorts C. Moreover the function h has to be strictly monotonic in the unobservable m. 19 These assumptions allow different sorting of individuals in treatment and control municipalities, but this sorting must be permanent and not change across cohorts being compared. Then the cohort effect C reflects a trend between cohorts, which is common across municipalities. The fact that we use the municipality of birth to assign reform status rather than the actual municipality of schooling strengthens the validity of this assumption because it controls for the composition effects that can arise if people sort themselves into different locations as a result of the reform. On the one hand, this means that the estimates are of the "intention-to-treat" type. On the other hand we avoid selection issues coming from differential endogenous mobility.
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In addition to these basic assumptions we also impose certain functional form restrictions. In particular for mortality and mortality by cause we use Cox proportional hazards models and competing risk models where it is straightforward to control for over 1000 municipality fixed effects and the cohort effects, using the principle of the partial likelihood (see Cox and Oates, 1984) . The effect of the reform is then estimated as a factor of proportionality on the unrestricted baseline hazard.
For cognitive and social skills we standardize the test score results and use linear differencein-differences as well as the nonparametric approach of Athey and Imbens (discussed below). Finally for binary outcomes 21 (probability of hospitalizations or receipt of sick pay) we use the linear probability model. This choice has been motivated by the fact we need to control for over 1,000 municipality fixed effects and 12 cohort effects. For relatively small treatment effects, when alternative approaches have been used in a similar context, the results are almost identical.
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Parental inputs into child human capital production and the response to government interventions may differ depending on parental socio-economic (SES) background. For example, while we may expect wealthier parents to substitute resources away from children as the government increases inputs, the behavior of poorer parents may be quite different: if a small amount of 19 Discrete outcomes, which violate strict monotonicity, require further identifying assumptions. 20 However, the evidence for selective mobility is weak if there at all, as shown in Meghir and Palme (2005) . 21 The army cognitive skills tests consist of four separate categories -a verbal (reading comprehension) test, "metal folding" (visual/spatial test), technical comprehension and logic. The cognitive skills tests consist of 40 questions each. A draftee could obtain a maximum score of 160.
22 See for example Meghir, Palme and Schnabel (2011). resources is not in itself capable of generating returns, poor parents may refrain from investing in their children. However, when more resources become available it may now become worthwhile for parents to invest. In this case poorer parents may crowd in resources. Finally, the interventions themselves, such as increasing compulsory schooling, may only be relevant for lower socioeconomic groups. They may also have very different impacts depending on prior achievement and ability. For all these reasons we present results by parental socio-economic status (SES) and when using only the data from the 1948/53 cohorts, by ability. By controlling for background characteristics we relax the underlying assumptions of the diff-in-diffs specification. We can also allow for differential municipality trends by year of reform implementation (so that all municipalities who implemented the reform in the same year are assigned the same trend) and by individual municipality of birth, since we observe outcomes for a number of years before and after the reform when we rely on administrative data.
As a further robustness check we implement the nonlinear difference-in-differences estimator of Athey and Imbens (2006) for the cognitive test scores. This non-parametric procedure can be particularly useful in the context of test scores because the scale there is completely arbitrary and there is no guarantee that the scale used is the appropriate one for implementing the usual linear difference in differences procedure; indeed even the sign of the treatment effect can switch if we use linear difference in differences with an ad-hoc scale (see Meghir and Rivkin, 2011) .
Missing data for non-cognitive skills
For the 1948 cohort the Swedish army only required non-cognitive skills interviews and scoring for those individuals who had achieved a score of 5 or more on a cumulative cognitive skills scale. This scale ranges from 1 to 10 and is a simpler representation of the cumulative distribution of the cognitive skills test scores. Only men with scores 5 and above, as prescribed by the army manual, obtained non-cognitive skills evaluation. In the 1953 cohort all men obtained a score by a psychologist, regardless of their performance on the cognitive tests.
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To solve the missing data problem we proceed as follows. Define by y c the cognitive score and y nc the non-cognitive one and suppose they are determined by the equation Figure 1A in the Appendix shows the mapping from Army cognitive skills scores to the probability of having a noncognitive skills score for the 1948 cohort.
where x includes all the regressors on the right hand side of the diff-in-diffs regression. Now we make the control function assumption ( | , ) = ( | ) and take the conditional expectation of the second equation given the cognitive score. We thus get that
where the function f can be estimated non-parametrically. 24 Under joint normality this function is linear. However, the key point is that by conditioning on the residual from the cognitive regression score we control for the endogenous selection. Moreover, in this case where we observe the entire distribution of the cognitive scores no exclusion restriction is required; the only assumption is the control function assumption.
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6. Results
Effects of the reform on educational attainment
Earlier studies have established the impact of the reform on educational attainment. 26 We confirm that these results hold for our extended administrative sample in Table 5 with similar estimates, although we now include many more cohorts and there is no reason for the effects to be the same.
We also exclude individuals who were born in Stockholm. It appears that in Stockholm boys in the same birth cohort could attend schools of both types, and thus it is not immediately clear how they should be classified in terms of reform status.
The average effect of the reform was an increase in attained years of education of 0.22, a little over two and a half months. Both high and low SES background children are affected by the reform, but the magnitudes of the effects and the statistical significance are very different. High SES children's educational attainment increases by 5% of a school year, while low SES children's education increases by 28%, or almost three and a half calendar months. 24 We use a polynomial to approximate the function f. 25 Using residuals in this way goes back to Telser (1961) and underlies the extensive literature on using control functions. 26 Due to extensive previous research on the schooling reform our discussion here is limited. See discussions of the nature and the validity of the reform as a social experiment in Holmlund (2007) and Meghir and Palme (2005) . Note: Reform status is assigned based on the municipality of birth. All birth years (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) and all municipalities included except Stockholm. Municipality and cohort fixed effects, linear trends by year of reform implementation included in all specifications; *** indicates significance at the 1% level; standard errors clustered on the municipality of birth level. The sample sizes of low and high SES subsamples do not add up to the total number of observations because of missing information on father's education.
Thus we expect the bulk of the reform effect on human capital to be demonstrated among men with low SES background. However, since the new educational system abolished tracking for children over 12, it also affected the education received by the higher SES children who were the main group attending the academic track. It is thus possible that they are also affected by the reform in ways that are not easy to predict. Table 6 shows the results for the effects of the school reform on cognitive skills. These measures are obtained by the army during the army draft tests and are unrelated to the school curriculum. The data source here is the random sample from the 1948 and 1953 cohorts for whom we have this enhanced information set. We present simple difference-in-differences results. We then experiment in turn with adding ability controls or adding differential trends by year of reform implementation, and finally both. All results show clear and strong evidence that the reform improved cognitive ability by 7% to 15% of a standard deviation. This demonstrates that increasing compulsory schooling can improve cognitive outcomes even at this relatively advanced age. Moreover, it indicates that those who would have otherwise opted out of school can benefit by being kept in school. Of course, to complete the picture, we need both an evaluation of the cost as well as a market return to this benefit. Nevertheless the point remains that cognitive skills can be improved even at mid-adolescence with extra schooling.
Cognitive skills
In the 2 nd -5 th rows of the table we then break down this result by parental socioeconomic status and by high/low child ability measured before some boys were exposed to the reform. In rows (2) and (3) we split the sample by low and high father's education. Because of the relatively small sample size for highly educated fathers we cannot identify a difference in impacts for the two groups;
indeed we cannot reject the hypothesis that the impacts are the same. We then take the low SES group and we split it into those with below median ability at 12 and above median ability. 27 Here the point estimates are much larger for the lower ability group. The differences are significant at the 10% level.
The result is perhaps not surprising since most of the education effect for the low SES group comes from increased schooling of these lower ability students, who otherwise drop out, while the higher ability pupils dropped out much less. However it does make an important point that extra schooling is benefitting the lowest achievement group, a group that is often thought unreachable.
While research has shown that interventions at early ages have higher returns for the most disadvantaged, the pattern reverses by the adolescent years when returns to human capital investment are lower for lower ability and disadvantaged children (see the review by Cunha et al, 2006 , for a number of references)
The estimates vary somewhat depending on whether we include ability controls and/or trends by year of reform implementation; however qualitatively they do not change and these alternative specifications do not affect whether the impact is significant or not. Moreover, the results from different specifications are not significantly different from each other. Note: Each cell shows the coefficient on the reform dummy from a different regression. Reform status is assigned based on the municipality of birth. All municipalities of birth included except Stockholm. *** indicates significance at the 1% level; standard errors clustered on the municipality of birth level
As shown in Athey and Imbens (2006) , the key assumption underlying the difference-indifferences estimator is that in the absence of treatment, test scores are a monotonic transformation of an unobservable; the transformation may change over time, but the distribution of the unobservable, while different between treatment and comparison groups, must remain the same over time. Imposing a specific test score scale and the additive separability embodied in the linear DD estimator may distort the results.
To examine the robustness of our linear DD results we use an estimator proposed by Altonji and Blank (1999) and Athey and Imbens (2006) . One practical complication is that we have many treatment and comparison groups and we need to control for parental background and for ability. To achieve this we use all possible pairs of treatment and control municipalities and we stratify by high ability and low ability as well as by father's education. We then take the weighted average of all the results, the precision of each of the estimates serving as weights. The standard errors are computed using the bootstrap. We also compute the linear difference-in-differences estimator in the same way for comparability. The results shown in Table 7 suggest that relaxing the functional form assumption leads to higher estimates of the reform effect on cognitive skills compared to using the linear procedure.
While this result makes sense if the transformation from ability to scores is concave, the difference from the linear DD estimate is not statistically significant. Thus overall, our results are robust to relaxing the functional form assumption and if anything they seem to be underestimates of the impact of the reform on cognitive scores.
The point estimates for the impact of the reform are quite high: indeed if we take the group with low SES and we suppose that the entire effect of the reform operates through the quantity of obtained schooling, our estimates imply that an extra year of schooling at about 14 years of age causes an increase in cognitive scores at age 18 in the range of 32%-40% of a standard deviation. It is important to stress that we do not believe we can apply IV in such a way because we believe that the reform may have affected achievement for this group in more ways than only through an increase in the quantity of schooling. In particular, the reform also changed schooling quality by imposing a national curriculum and by abolishing tracking, so that high and low ability children now coexisted in the same classrooms thus changing the peer group structure for all.
Beyond these qualifications, the magnitude of the point estimates is similar to what has been found in the US-based literature studying the effects of education on AFQT scores. Cascio and Lewis (2005) find that an extra year of education improves minority students' cognitive scores by 33% of a standard deviation (SD). Neal and Johnson (1996) use US compulsory school age laws as in Angrist and Krueger (1991) to identify similar effects -gains of 0.25SD for women, and of 0.22SD for men; these gains are estimated for an older treated group, as the compulsory schooling laws bind around age 16 in the US. 28 Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2004) based on NLSY data and using a factor model to control for the endogeneity of education find very similar gains.
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Our result bring to bear new evidence, with a causal interpretation that more and better schooling can have substantial impacts on cognitive outcomes and hence on adult standard of living and social mobility.
Non-cognitive skills
The role of social skills is an important and separate dimension of human capital as has been emphasized by Heckman and co-authors in a number of papers. 30 Indeed analysis of the Perrypreschool experimental results, for example, seems to suggest that that particular intervention had no long run effect on IQ but did affect social skills; this in turn is the mediating factor to which the subsequent relative labor market success of the treatment group was attributed to. Table 8 shows how schooling reform affected social skills in our sample. The polynomial in the first stage residual is included to control for the missing data in the 1948 cohort as explained in Section 5. The residual is highly significant as we expect. We only present the results from the most general specification including differential linear trends by year of reform implementation and excluding controls for cognitive ability at age 12.
28 See also Whinship and Korenman, 1997 for a detailed review of the existing literature to date 29 An early study of this issue was carried out by Harnqvist (1968a Harnqvist ( , 1968b who uses data from the 1948 Swedish cohort. He found gains in the range of 44% of a SD among those who completed only the general comprehensive school and 54% SD for men who completed the theoretical comprehensive school as a terminal degree. The estimates are even larger than ours but he does not control for the endogeneity of education. 30 Cunha et al, 2006; Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006; Cunha, Heckman and Schennach, 2010; Carneiro, Heckman and Masterov, 2005 The results show a different pattern to those on cognition: the overall effect is an improvement of 17 percent of a standard deviation in social skills attributable to the reform. The surprising effect is that the impact is larger for those from a higher SES. Comparing columns 2 and 5 the difference in the estimated reform coefficient is significant at 5 percent with a t-statistic of 2.2.
Breaking down the effect for the low SES pupils by prior ability we obtain no significant differences although the point estimate is larger for the lower ability children. The result for the high SES group in column (5) is a bit surprising because the quantity of schooling itself did not increase for those from a higher SES background. From this we need to conclude that the other aspects of the reform, such as abolishing tracking and mixing children from various backgrounds in the classroom, also had important effects on outcomes at least in this dimension.
Health
The next dimension of human capital we look at is longer term health outcomes. Here we can rely both on the large administrative data source covering all relevant cohorts and the 1948/53 survey cohorts data. We estimated the effects of the reform effect on three types measures of health: mortality and mortality by cause; hospitalizations; sick leave pay. While mortality by the age of 60 is a relatively clean indicator of important health problems, hospitalizations may confound the impact of illness with the action of attending hospitals as a health investment. Sick leave pay will confound health outcomes with behaviors relating to the incentives induced by the social security system (see Palme, 1995 and 2005) . Nevertheless these incentives are common across treatment and comparison groups; the main concern there is whether the increase in wage due to the education reform induces a reduction in sick leave pay: this will still be a causal effect of the reform but could possibly be attributed to other factors than improvements in health. Despite the potential issues with hospitalizations and sick leave pay we report on the related analysis because they may pick up smaller changes in health that have no substantial impact on mortality but that have the potential to capture reform effects on productivity and wellbeing more generally.
Mortality
The results on mortality are reported in Tables 9A and 9B. Table 9A shows the results on aggregate mortality from the 1948/53 random sample cohort data as well as results using the entire administrative population dataset. We compare results estimated in the same way across the two samples, i.e. including differential trends by year of reform implementation, but with no initial cognitive ability controls, as these are not available in the population-level administrative data. The reported coefficients represent the proportional effect on the exit (mortality) hazard implied by the reform. A coefficient of 1 implies no change in mortality hazard, while a coefficient of less than one implies a decrease. The reported reform effect for the high SES background group is based on the full population of high SES men born in the 1948 and 1953 cohorts. This hazard ratio cannot be estimated for the smaller random subsample (approximately 10%) that was surveyed first at age 12 because there are too few deaths among high SES individuals in this group. All regressions include municipality and cohort dummies as well as linear trends by year of reform implementation.
From these results there is no firm indication that the school reform reduced overall mortality. In the much larger administrative data the overall effect is almost exactly zero. In the smaller cohort data set the point estimates imply a substantial reduction in the mortality hazard of about 50% but the effect is far from being significant.
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31 Such a large point estimate is not out of order because the overall mortality hazard is quite low for most people who are quite young.
However, based on the data from the 1948/53 cohort there seems to be a significant decline in mortality for those with lower initial ability. This is consistent with the educational attainment results -the decline in mortality is strongest in the population group for which the reform increased education most. The average mortality rate among men with low cognitive skills in 6 th grade is 5.5 percent. The point estimate reported in Table 9A implies a decline of mortality of 3.5 percentage points among those who attended the reformed school system, or 64 percent lower mortality than the base mortality of 5.5% in the group. On average, a man born in one of the affected cohorts with initial cognitive skills below the median at age 12, could expect to live for 227 months in 20 years.
Such a man who went through the reformed school will live on average an extra 8.5 months. The 95% confidence interval for this is (26.2,1.13 months) implying a significant but imprecisely estimated effect. This effect is lost when we consider the whole population or even just the full sample of low SES individuals. Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; cluster-robust confidence intervals in parentheses; confidence intervals in brackets under the estimate; standard errors clustered on the municipality of birth level; all municipalities of birth included, except Stockholm. Linear trends by year of reform implementation included in all specifications
Thus, there seems to be some evidence that for the most disadvantaged there have been significant health improvements. Unfortunately, the actual size of the improvement is not precisely estimated.
We next investigate the effect of the reform on mortality at different stages in life. Table 9B reports the estimates on mortality from any cause for age groups 40-49 and 50-60, respectively, as well as aggregate mortality for the entire population. The data also allow us to divide the sample on the basis of father's education (SES). The results show a marginally significant decrease in mortality as a result of the reform for males between the ages of 40 and 50. However there is no significant effect on later mortality, where the point estimates imply a slight and insignificant increase. The small decline in mortality is fully attributable to men from a lower SES background. The education reform seems to have reduced mortality at a younger age for individuals from a poorer background.
This translates only to a very small effect on life expectancy, which is not surprising given mortality between the ages of 40 and 50 is very low. The crude mortality rate in the male population from low SES backgrounds aged 40-50 is 2.22 percent. The results in Table 9B imply that the reform reduces this by 9 percentage points to 2.02 percent. Thus, the average low SES background male at age 40 could expect to live for 117.34 months in the next 10 years. The reform increased that by just 7.6 days, which is significant at the 10% level. The increase in life expectancy is therefore essentially zero and quite precisely estimated. Still, the decrease attributable to the reform at an age when mortality is so low anyway may reveal some underlying improvements in health and could mask counteracting effects as we investigate now.
Mortality can be affected by behavior; for example smoking can cause lung cancer and excess drinking can cause liver disease. While education may induce healthier behaviors, as the economic returns to education and better skills realize, they may also lead to increases in consumption of unhealthy goods; on the other hand other health outcomes may not be directly affected by such consumption patterns but could be sensitive to health investments such as exercise and obtaining on-time treatment. Improved education may act in opposite directions in each case. Notes: Cluster-robust 95% confidence intervals in parentheses; standard errors are clustered on the municipality of birth level; all municipalities of birth are included except Stockholm; linear trends by year of reform implementation included in all estimations. The samples of low and high SES background men do not add up to the aggregate sample size because of missing information on father's education in the registry data Previous research in the medical sciences has affirmed that cause of death may signal (lack of) investments in different types of health promoting behaviors (McGinnis, 1993) . We investigate the possibility that the aggregate mortality effects of the reform mask a shift in the distribution of deaths by cause of death in Table A7 in the Appendix. We look separately at "Treatable" and "Preventable" causes of death since these relate directly to health behaviors. We also look explicitly at circulatory diseases and cancer because in the descriptive analysis we found that mortality from circulatory diseases had a stronger education gradient than mortality due to cancer. Again, we find no convincing evidence that extra schooling differentially reduced the distribution of mortality from some causes compared to others.
Analyzing the probability of hospitalization and hospitalizations by cause yields additional evidence consistent with the mortality findings. Table A8 in the Appendix reports the results from a series of linear probability regressions estimating the reform effects on the probability of any hospitalization, and on hospitalizations from different causes. Although the estimates are obtained with quite high rate of precision, we are not able to reject a zero effect for any of the sub-groups or diagnoses under study. For overall hospitalization we can reject effects larger than 0.6 percent in any direction and for circulatory diseases the corresponding number is 0.5 percent. The background to these small effects could either be that the effects on the underlying health are very small or that the effects are counteracted by increased healthcare consumption given health status. Note however, that this hypothesized behavioral response to increased health-care consumption would not be related to treatment costs, since health care is free in Sweden.
Sick pay
In Table 10 we present results from linear probability regressions using the full panel of individual level data across years (1991-2002 and 2004-2006 ) for which we have information on sick leave payments. Although previous research (see Palme, 1995 and 2005) has shown that economic incentives affect the propensity to claim sick-pay insurance benefits in Sweden, and the reform indeed increased labor earnings, the estimated elasticities from this previous research suggest that the effect is negligible in the present context. In addition, the data we use on sick-pay insurance benefits stems from spells longer than seven days where a certificate from a physician is needed for the right to receive benefits. This limits the influence of other factors than health for this outcome measure.
The results in Table 10 show that men who went to reform schools have a 0.2 percent lower probability of taking sick leave in any year, which is a decrease of 1.2 percent estimated at the mean.
This estimated impact for men coming from low SES backgrounds is 1.5 percent evaluated at the mean. The effect of education reform on the sick-leave taking of high SES men is quite precisely estimated to be zero. Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality of birth level; all birth municipalities included except Stockholm; all estimations include municipality of birth fixed effects; linear trends by year of reform implementation included in all estimations
The impact is very small (effectively zero), and particularly so if we note that the overall claim rate is actually quite high. The fact we only obtain an effect for the lower SES group is consistent with the rest of the results and the way the reform impacted; the fact that hospitalizations did not decline implies that this small improvement either does not really reflect health, but changed incentives to claim due to higher opportunity cost of time, or that the underlying health improvements are small. These results are consistent with the overall picture that if there were any health gains from the reform, they are very small and concentrated among those with lower SES backgrounds.
Conclusions
We constructed two data sets based on administrative and survey data to estimate the effects of a major Swedish educational reform -that increased compulsory schooling -on cognitive skills, social skills and health, all of which are key determinants of long-term SES and wellbeing. The nature of the implementation of the reform as a social experiment provides credible exogenous variation. Our rich data allows us to focus separately on different socioeconomic and initial ability groups and estimate potentially small effects with precision.
We find that the reform had a major effect on cognitive skills, particularly for those from lower SES backgrounds and those with lower prior ability. Social skills did not improve for this group but they did for those from a higher socio-economic background, an outcome that we interpret as resulting from the fact they no longer attended selective schools and came into contact with a broader mix of people.
The overall reform impact on health is very small. This is true across a wide variety of health measures, including mortality, cause-specific mortality, hospitalizations and sick pay receipt.
However the most disadvantaged group in our smaller cohort sample, those with below median ability as measured at age 12, show a significant and relatively large increase of 8 months of life expectancy between the ages of 40 and 60. While significant this effect is imprecisely estimated. Our results indicate that if there are any effects of education on health for societies like Sweden in the 1950s, they are more likely to be found amongst the most disadvantaged, and that is where future research should focus. Socialstyrelsen (2009b ) The Swedish National Patient Register. Inpatient diseases in Sweden 1987 -2007 . Sweden, Stockholm. 2009 . Spasojevic, Jasmina (2010 
The Implementation of the Swedish Comprehensive Schooling Reform
The nationwide experiment with the new comprehensive school started in 1949, the year before the first parliamentary decision on the comprehensive school reform, and continued until the final curriculum of the post-reform schools was decided in 1962. There was a main evaluation of the experiment starting in 1957 (see Försöksverksamhet med nioårig skolplikt,1959) . This evaluation was, however, mostly on administrative issues.
There were at least two reasons as to why a nationwide experiment was set up before the implementation of the new school. First, there was a widespread belief in scientific evaluations among the generation of Swedish politicians who were active at that time, in particular among those involved in education policy (see Marklund, 1981) . In their view, an experiment was a means for improving different aspects of the proposed new school. Second, and more importantly, it was a way of conciliate the strong resistance against the reform both within the parliamentary school committee and in different parts of the education system. An experiment with a comprehensive school was a first step in a compromise.
In the experiment, the proposed comprehensive school was implemented by areas, entire municipalities or parts of city communities, rather than by separate schools or classes. By the time the experiment started, Sweden was divided into about 2,500 city communities and rural municipalities. The first two years of the experiment were administered through the parliamentary school committee. The municipalities selected to try out the new system in these first two years (1949 and 1950) had to fulfill two requirements (1) The length of the compulsory schooling should be 8 rather than 7 years -a requirement that was dropped two years later. (2) The demographic structure of the municipality should permit a continuous flow of pupils into the new school system. On this basis 264 municipalities were considered eligible of which 144 declared an interest in implementing the new system. Of these, 11 municipalities and 3 parts of city communities were the first to be selected into the program. The rationale for choosing these particular areas was that they were considered to be representative, demographically and geographically, for the entire country. After two years, the administration of the experiment was taken over by a special unit of the National school board.
As the experiment proceeded, it is less well documented how the municipalities to be included in the experiment were selected. It is, however, evident that the basic structure of the selection was maintained throughout the experiment. First, the municipalities were contacted, or applied directly, to be included in the experiment. From these applications, the administration selected the participants with the aim of obtaining a "representative" sample of municipalities. At least up to the evaluation in 1957 (see Försöksverksamhet med nioårig skolplikt, 1959) , and probably also after that, there were more applications than admissions in the experiment.
Since compulsory schooling was extended in the municipalities where the comprehensive school was implemented, and since some of the students would have started to work immediately after finishing the pre-reform compulsory school, the financial burden for some of the families increased as a result of the experiment. To mitigate these problems, two different strategies for family support were used. First, general support for families with children through a non-taxable universal allowance for children up to the age of 16 was introduced in 1948. Second, in 1953, when the first cohort included in the experiment reached 9th grade, means tested stipends were introduced in the reform areas. 
Education and Human Capital Outcomes
The health results have been derived by Table A3 we show the distribution of deaths by difference cause in the treated and control populations.
Hazard rates that are lower than unity indicate a protective effect; those above unity imply an increase in the hazard associated with a unit change in the variable. The confidence interval is shown in brackets. An extra year of education is associated with a lower overall mortality risk up to age sixty by 10.5% among men. This is within the range implied by US estimates reported by LlerasMuney and , who find a 1.8 percentage point reduction associated with an extra year of education in the 5-year mortality rate among adults aged 25 and over. 32 These are large significant gains in life expectancy associated with more education. Interesting patterns emerge when we break down mortality by the main causes -cancers, circulatory disease, and potentially treatable and avoidable mortality. Consistent with the view that the risk of getting cancer diseases are less affected by lifestyles and health behaviors, increases in education are associated with the smallest gains in cancer-related mortality. It is important to stress here that cancer mortality depends both on the incidence and the treatment of cancer, thus even if we expect completely random incidence, disparities would emerge if more educated individuals receive better or more timely care.
The strongest gains due to education are in preventable mortality for men. This cause of death category groups lung cancer and liver cirrhosis, which are strongly associated with smoking and drinking, respectively. These types of mortality are most strongly affected by health behaviors and lifestyle, suggesting that health behaviors are a major channel through which education affects health. Table A5 shows the relationship between education and the probability of being hospitalized.
The outcome is a binary variable equal to one if the person was hospitalized overnight for any cause at any time during the period 1987-2005. We run linear probability models. Even if we were to take education as exogenous, the probability of hospitalization depends on two potentially conflicting channels. First, worsening underlying health would increase the incidence of hospitalizations. This implies that more educated individuals would be hospitalized less often. However, hospitalization is 32 In a robustness check we defined the 5-year mortality rate by municipality and birth cohort as defined by and estimated OLS coefficients of the effects of an extra year of education on the 5-year mortality rate controlling for municipality of birth and cohort fixed effects. We found estimates very similar to the ones reported for the US -around 4 percent decrease in the 5-year rate for men and 3.7 percent decrease for women. 33 Includes lung cancers and liver cirrhosis only also a means of health investment. Higher educated individuals may have higher returns from such investments. This implies that more educated people would be more likely to be hospitalized for planned treatments. In addition, higher educated individuals may have lower discount rates and thus invest more anyway, further increasing hospitalizations. As it turns out (Table A5) hospitalizations are negatively associated to increases in education. An extra year of schooling decreases the probability of hospitalization by 1.4 percentage points among men. We emphasize that cancer hospitalizations do not appear to be significantly affected by education; however cancer mortality is lower among the better educated. This suggests that one of the channels through which education lowers mortality is by improving survival chances post-diagnosis. Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table A6 shows the estimated hazard ratios from a Cox proportional hazard model for retirement using years of schooling and dummy variables for cohort of birth as independent variables. The results reveal a very strong association between education and the timing of retirement: every year of additional education is associated with an about 9 percent decrease in the probability of exiting from the labor force for both males and females. As a sensitivity analysis, we have repeated these estimates using different thresholds for labor earnings and the results are robust to these checks. Notes: * is significant at the 10% level; Cluster-robust confidence intervals in parentheses, clustered at the municipality of birth level; all municipalities included except Stockholm; all estimations stratified at the municipality of birth level; linear trends by year of reform implementation included in all estimations. Mortality by cause categories are mutually exclusive, meaning that ICD codes of death are assigned to only one mortality cause. Individual mortality from different causes is defined as follows. An individual who died from any kind of cancer except lung cancer (which is a preventable cause of death) is assigned 1 in the cancer death category. Individuals who did not die from cancer, even if they died from another cause or from lung cancer (preventable) is assigned a 0 in the cancer death category. Appendix table A2 lists individual ICD codes of death that are assigned to each mortality category. 
